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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we describe the study we carried out to replicate and
extend the field observation study of real world ATM use carried
out by De Luca et al., published at the SOUPS conference in 2010
[10]. Replicating De Luca et al.’s study, we observed PIN shield-
ing rates at ATMs in Germany. We then extended their research
by conducting a similar field observation study in Sweden and the
United Kingdom. Moreover, in addition to observing ATM users
(withdrawing), we also observed electronic payment scenarios re-
quiring PIN entry. Altogether, we gathered data related to 930
observations. Similar to De Luca et al., we conducted follow-up
interviews, the better to interpret our findings. We were able to
confirm De Luca et al.’s findings with respect to low PIN shield-
ing incidence during ATM cash withdrawals, with no significant
differences between shielding rates across the three countries. PIN
shielding incidence during electronic payment scenarios was sig-
nificantly lower than incidence during ATM withdrawal scenarios
in both the United Kingdom and Sweden. Shielding levels in Ger-
many were similar during both withdrawal and payment scenarios.
We conclude the paper by suggesting a number of explanations for
the differences in shielding that our study revealed.
1. INTRODUCTION
People have been drawing cash from automated teller machines
(ATM) for at least half a century [4]. The 21st century heralded an
increasing use of card-based electronic payments [13]. Most bank
cards are Chip & PIN based, allowing people either to withdraw
money or pay for goods and services using the same card. To com-
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plete a transaction, the customer presents the card and provides a
PIN to authenticate themselves. Exceptions are, for instance, Ger-
many, where Chip & Signature is a common alternative to Chip
& PIN, and the United Kingdom, where contactless payment (tap
only for amounts less than £30) is gaining market share [39]. PINs
are required during withdrawals in all countries, no matter how low
the transaction amount.
PIN entry is not without risk, since thieves could observe the PIN
(in person, or using a camera) and use the knowledge later, once
they have managed to clone or steal the actual card. To prevent
this, people are advised to take the precaution of shielding their
PINs when they enter it (as well as being advised not to carry a
note of their PIN together with the actual card).
In 2010, De Luca et al. investigated factors that impacted decisions
related to taking security precautions when engaging in PIN-based
ATM authentication [10]. The researchers observed how people
entered their PINs at ATMs; in particular, whether people acted to
protect their PIN entry from possible skimming attacks [3]. They
conducted follow-up interviews to gain insights into the contex-
tual factors affecting secure behaviors. We replicated their research
study, and extended it as follows:
• PIN usage scenarios: Common electronic payment scenar-
ios (i.e. in supermarkets or in restaurants / coffee bars) are
very similar to withdrawing money from an ATM in terms
of PIN authentication being required. We wanted to explore
differences in PIN usage during payment scenarios, too. We
also wanted to elicit explanations for shielding differences
we observed. Similar research questions were suggested by
De Luca et al. as a topic of future interesting investigations
[10].
• Countries: While De Luca et al. [10] collected data in Ger-
many and the Netherlands, they only reported overall obser-
vations. However, we believed that more detailed compar-
isons between different countries, particularly when consid-
ering different scenarios (payment/withdrawal), would de-
liver interesting insights in terms of shielding percentages
and factors impacting PIN shielding.
Following the previous researchers’ example, we commenced with
an observational field study and then conducted interviews once the
data from the first study was analysed. We collected data in Ger-
many, similar to De Luca et al. We also extended the observation
field study to both Sweden and the United Kingdom, and conducted
interviews in all three countries.
De Luca et al. reported that 67% of the observed ATM users did
not take any precautions against PIN skimming attacks. Almost
a decade later, we observed the same high percentage of people
not shielding PIN entry at ATMs (64% in Germany, 71% in the
U.K, and 71% in Sweden). We discovered that the activity of either
withdrawing or paying, as well as the observation country, were
significant predictors of PIN shielding behavior. Further results are:
• In Germany, there was no significant difference in PIN shield-
ing incidence during withdrawal and payment scenarios.
• In the United Kingdom and Sweden, we observed signif-
icantly fewer people shielding their PINs during payment,
than during withdrawal transactions.
• Significantly more people shielded their PINs when paying
with their cards in Germany, as compared to the United King-
dom and Sweden.
• Significantly more people shielded their PINs when paying
with their cards in the United Kingdom, as compared to Swe-
den.
De Luca et al. identified a number of contextual factors from their
follow-up interviews to determine why people did, or did not, shield
PIN entry. One was that of being accompanied. We also recorded
whether or not people were accompanied in our observation field
study. However, our study did not reveal significant differences for
this factor.
The interviews helped us to explain our findings; particularly with
respect to the differences between shielding incidence during with-
drawing and paying. Possible explanations are habituation (people
engaging in more electronic transactions feel safer doing so, and
are less likely to shield their PINs), lack of reminders to shield, the
presence of hard cash during withdrawals, different goals (with-
drawing means the primary goal is obtaining cash in hand; paying
means the primary goal is obtaining desired products or services),
and a lack of understanding of the actual attack scenarios. In terms
of the latter, the primary threat might not be surrounding people, but
rather strategically positioned security cameras which could easily
record unshielded PINs.
Thus, we conclude that it seems particularly worthwhile to add
opaque hardware shields to Chip&PIN devices which effectively
removes the need for people to shield themselves. Just-in-time re-
minders might also reduce the risk of criminals gaining knowledge
of people’s PINs, as well as raising awareness of PIN shielding
during payment scenarios.
2. METHODOLOGY
We commence by providing details of De Luca et al.’s study, and
explaining how we went about replicating and extending it. In par-
ticular, we explain what precautions we took in order to ensure
that the research was carried out in accordance with ethical require-
ments.
2.1 De Luca et al.’s Study
De Luca et al. [10] carried out a PIN observation study in 2010.
Goal: Their goal was better to understand PIN-based ATM authen-
tication both with respect to taking any precautions against PIN
skimming attacks and the time needed to authenticate. Further-
more, they wanted to determine how alternative authentication ap-
proaches could be evaluated and compared to existing ones.
Methodology: During their research, De Luca et al. observed
ATM interactions at six locations in two cities in Germany and the
Netherlands: a total of 360 observations. The observations (i.e.
whether or not to shield the PIN entry and how long authentica-
tion takes) were recorded on a tally sheet during multiple sessions,
by the same researcher “to keep the data comparable, since dif-
ferent people might apply different standards during the observa-
tion, deliberately or not” [10, p. 2]. After analyzing the collected
data, several problems regarding the timing were identified. Corre-
spondingly, two followup studies were conducted. To gain greater
insights into the findings from the field evaluation, they subse-
quently carried out interviews with other people (not the ones they
observed).
Findings: They found that the majority of the people they observed
(65%) did not take any precautions against PIN skimming attacks
(i.e. less than 65% shielded their PIN entry). In addition. the in-
terviews revealed that contextual factors exerted a strong influence
both on security behaviors and to the time required to authenticate.
Example factors are distractions, physical hindrance (e.g. due to
bags in peoples hands), and trust relations. Based on their findings,
they suggested a number of “lessons learned” to inform subsequent
field studies into the use of privacy-sensitive technologies, as well
as a number of implications for the design of alternative ATM au-
thentication systems. Their lessons learned section emphasised the
importance of improving tally sheet designs during trial studies and
adherence to strict rules during observations to ensure validity and
comparability of the results.
2.2 Achieving Replication
We based the study design on De Luca et al.’s [10], and also incor-
porate design aspects from their lessons learned section.
Similar to De Luca et al.’s study, each location was visited at least
twice during different time periods. By doing so, we ensured that
the collected data was as diverse as possible. Replicating De Luca
et al.’s study, we observed a variety of different bank ATM ma-
chines at different locations. We also observed a variety of sce-
narios during which PIN-based authentication was required during
electronic payment.
We chose the locations similarly to De Luca et al. for their study.
In effect, we chose locations that enabled us non-intrusively to ob-
serve the interactions with the corresponding devices. We identified
scenarios where the devices were visible from public seating areas,
such as street cafés. By so doing, we ensured that the observer did
not arouse suspicion. Similar to De Luca et al., the observation
sessions were not prolonged so as to minimize the risk of raising
suspicion and concern.
As reported by De Luca et al., all observations were performed and
recorded (in written form) by only one researcher. This eliminated
inter-observer bias. Following De Luca et al.’s protocol, observa-
tions were only added to the data set if the observer was 100% sure
about whether the subject had shielded their PIN or not. If his view
was obscured, the observer did not record the event. The researcher
did not observe any fraudulent incidents during the observation ses-
sions.
2.3 Observation Study
We now describe the variations we studied, for each of the two
factors (PIN usage scenario, country/locations), and the content of
the written protocol.
2.3.1 PIN Usage Scenarios
De Luca et al. investigated actions connected with ATM with-
drawals. We studied interactions during this scenario and also stud-
ied payment scenarios during which PINs were required to au-
thenticate: supermarkets and restaurants/coffee bars. Compared to
withdrawing cash, the electronic payment process does not involve
actual cash being handled. Furthermore, the subject’s main task is
to purchase something. Unlike ATM interactions, which is a solo
activity, other people are often legitimately involved in payment
interactions. For example, a shop assistant might be instructing a
customer to insert their card and enter their PIN. We wanted to de-
termine whether these different scenarios (withdrawing vs. paying)
would make a difference to PIN shielding rates. We also consid-
ered two different types of payment scenarios, so as to reveal dif-
ferences between payments in supermarkets at the cash register and
payments in a restaurant/coffee bar setting.
Our 930 field observations were performed at different locations:
310 in each country. Besides ATMs, we observed people at various
electronic payment scenarios involving a PIN authentication. The
observation field study took place over a period of two weeks in
each country. After the field observation study, follow-up public
interviews were conducted in all three countries.
2.3.2 Countries and Locations
We conducted our observation field study in three different Euro-
pean countries, each with different profiles with respect to with-
drawing cash and cashless payments. Based on data from the Eu-
ropean Central Bank [13] and Eurostat [38], we identified three
countries for our study: Germany, the United Kingdom and Swe-
den. People living in Germany, on average, withdraw money about
as frequently as they pay electronically. People living in the United
Kingdom use bank cards more frequently for both, to withdraw
(smaller amounts of) money and generally pay for things electron-
ically. Furthermore, in the United Kingdom, contactless payment
(for payments under £30) is gaining market share [39]. This only
requires PIN authentication for amounts over £30. In Sweden,
“cash is used relatively infrequently [...] while cards are used to
a great extent” [33] and also for very small amounts of money. For
more details about the differences see Table 1.
We chose locations in each country to collect samples that are broad
in range and comparable to each other.
Frankfurt, Germany. We included two ATMs in Germany (45 ob-
servations each). Both were located in train stations. Furthermore,
observations were conducted in a supermarket (100 observations)
and two restaurants (120 observations). A notable distinction be-
tween those restaurants was that customers at one restaurant paid
before eating, while customers in the other restaurant paid just be-
fore departing.
Glasgow, United Kingdom. Our observations in the United King-
dom comprised a supermarket (100 observations), a fast food restau-
rant, and a coffee bar (both with 120 observations in total) as well as
two ATMs in pedestrian precincts (45 observations each). The fast
food restaurant provided multiple self-service kiosks, while cus-
tomers in the coffee bar queued at a single teller.
U.K. Germany Sweden
Withdrawals per capita 43.98 32.43 21.96
Avg. value of withdrawal
(Euro)
83.00 128.21 108.88
Card payments per capita 178.99 33.21 235.47
Avg. value of card payment
(Euro)
59.28 72.09 32.1
Avg. number of PIN entries
per capita
222.97 65.64 257.43
Table 1: The number and value of withdrawals and card pay-
ments in the United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden in 2014
[13]. The average number of PIN entries per capita is based on
the population on the 1st of January 2014 [38]. This presents an
upper bound for Germany because Chip & Sign is commonly
used [12] and for the United Kingdom because of the high usage
of contactless payments [14].
Karlstad, Sweden. The observations in Sweden comprised two
ATMs inside a building (45 observations each), a supermarket in-
side a mall (100 observations in total), a restaurant within a depart-
ment store, and a payment terminal at the exit of the same depart-
ment store (in total, 120 observations).
2.3.3 Written Protocol
The written protocol comprised the following information: coun-
try, scenario (including ATM vs. supermarket vs. restaurant/coffee
bar), time of the day/date, shielded (or not), and whether accom-
panied by other people (or not). The fact that the latter might be
important was suggested by De Luca et al.’s findings [10]. Their
interviewees suggested that being accompanied negatively impacts
people’s decisions to shield due to social awkwardness.
2.4 Follow-Up: Public Interviews
We conducted public follow-up interviews, in order the better to
interpret our observation findings. Interviews took place over a
period of several days in the same cities where observations took
place (while not necessarily close to the observation locations).
Similar to De Luca et al.’s protocol, people were first asked whether
they would be available for a short interview. If they consented,
they were informed that the interview was being conducted as part
of a research project, and assured that no private data would be
collected. Subjects were asked to be frank and honest in their re-
sponses. They were not interrupted as long as they felt like talk-
ing. Notes were taken manually. The interviews were conducted
in English in the United Kingdom and Sweden, and in German in
Germany.
The interview protocol was slightly different to the one from De
Luca et al.’s . Because we had extended the observation field study
by adding additional scenarios and countries, we wanted to address
the differences we identified between these different settings in par-
ticular between the payment and the withdrawing scenario. We thus
used the following protocol:
1. Describe, in detail, how you use your card to pay when shop-
ping.
2. Describe, in detail, how you use your card to withdraw money
at an ATM.
3. If PIN shielding has not been mentioned during the first two
responses, ask:
(a) “You probably use only one hand to operate the device.
What do you usually do with your other hand in both
situations?”
(b) “Do you regularly shield your PIN entry?”
4. If PIN shielding is only mentioned in connection with ATMs:
(a) What is the difference between withdrawing at an ATM
and paying in a shop?
(b) Why do you shield your PIN at one but not the other?
5. Have you heard about crimes related to PIN entry? If so,
what did you hear and where did you hear it?
6. Do you sometimes see other people covering their hands when
they enter their PINs? What do you think when you see them
do this? Why?
7. Assume you are in a shop, or at an ATM, with a good friend,
and he or she shields their PIN as they enter it. What would
you think? Why?
Note that we decided to commence the interview with questions
about scenarios, whereas De Luca et al. asked questions specifi-
cally about PIN security. We wanted to make sure we did not bias
initial responses by mentioning security.
2.5 Ethical and Legal Considerations
When we investigate security behaviors, self reports often do not
reflect actual behaviors, due to the social desirability effect [16,
36]. This makes surveys and interviews less than reliable in deliv-
ering insights into security-related behaviors. Observations reveal
actual, rather than self-reported, behaviors, which is invaluable in
understanding how to improve the design of socio-technical secu-
rity systems.
Observational studies are a powerful tool for studying social worlds
[23], and security behaviors in public places lend themselves to ob-
servational studies. Yet observational studies require researchers to
take extra special care with respect to ethical and legal aspects of
their studies. Before commencing the observations, we thus con-
sidered the ethical and legal aspects very carefully.
Ethical requirements and general recommendations provided by the
American Psychological Association in their Ethical Principles of
Psychologists and Code of Conduct [1] and the British Sociological
Society Guidelines [6] were followed in planning this study. Ethics
requirements and general recommendations provided by Technis-
che Universität Darmstadt1 [37] were strictly adhered to. However,
two areas of concern merited special consideration and are there-
fore further discussed in the next paragraphs: (1) informed consent,
and (2) deception.
(1) Informed Consent: The first issue was that it was not possible
to obtain informed consent from the subjects we observed in our
study. To seek consent would likely have changed behavior and
compromised the integrity of the investigation [6, 34]. Spicker [34]
1Relevant for the research reported here (observational study with-
out any interaction with the participants) are the avoidance of dam-
age, stress, fear or other aversive effects on the subjects of the study,
i.e. the observed, the avoidance of the collection of personal data, if
this is not necessary, and the preservation of subject anonymity, es-
pecially in the collection of data related to minorities, which could
be deanonymised unintentionally by statistical linking of data.
explains that some studies simply cannot obtain consent. He cites
three examples: “Observing a crowd at a football match, watching
drivers in moving cars, or attending a meeting of shareholders”
(p. 3). We believe our context to be similar to these, in the sense
that requiring the researcher to obtain consent would have made it
impossible for him to carry out the research in an ecologically-valid
way.
Murphy and Dingwall [29], reporting on the ethics of ethnographic
studies, argue that people in public spaces can expect to be scru-
tinized by anonymous others. They explain that, in the case of
public behavior, people’s consent to being observed is implied by
their presence in the public place. Yet the researcher has to treat
their subjects with respect and decency, which is what we sought
to do. We considered that, in our study, consent was unachievable
and would have invalidated our findings. Spicker [34] explains that
where there is a need to carry out research that is minimally intru-
sive, in public, it is often not possible to obtain consent from those
being observed. We thus did not obtain informed consent from our
observed subjects.
(2) Deception: The second potential concern is that subjects in ob-
servation studies are often subject to deception. We designed our
study to be a covert non-participant observation study instead of
a researcher-as-participant study, which is much more deceptive,
and makes it more difficult for researchers to preserve anonymity
of subjects. This is harder to justify ethically than the kind of non-
intrusive study we carried out [29, 11]. Our subjects were not de-
liberately deceived at all, so this was not an ethical concern.
However, there are some limitations and challenges to consider
when carrying out non-participant covert observation studies [25,
31]:
(a) Observer Effect: the observer’s presence could affect the ac-
tions of the subject.
(b) Objectivity: the observer needs to ensure that he/she maintains
objectivity during observation.
(c) Selectivity: ensuring that observations are captured in a variety
of situations to offset selectivity bias.
(d) Hearing the subjects’ voices: ensuring that the final account
does not only reflect the researcher’s voice.
(e) Unobtrusiveness: not standing out in the environment when
recording observations.
The limitations were addressed by the following precautions, repli-
cating all of those applied by De Luca et al. [10] (Table 2 shows
the mapping between the limitations and the precautions.)
(1) Privacy: PIN entry is a secret and sensitive issue. It was es-
sential to ensure that we did not gain knowledge of anyone’s
PIN while carrying out the observations. The observation lo-
cations were selected so that, in order to respect the privacy
and secrecy of our unwitting subjects, we were always able to
observe from a vantage point that allowed us to see whether
people were shielding PIN entry, but not to be able to observe
the PIN itself. This was achieved either by positioning the ob-
server to the side of the device, at an obtuse angle, or to position
the observer too far away to be able to observe anything more
than the use of a hand or wallet to shield PIN entry.
(2) Location Accessibility & Variety: the observation locations
were selected in such a way that the observer could not see the
device’s screen, and were easily accessible. Moreover, obser-
vations were carried out at a range of locations.
(3) Anonymity: We did not collect any personal data such as names,
contact data, photos or videos, so as to grant our subjects full
anonymity.
(4) Respect: we interviewed other Chip&PIN card holders, who
were not observed subjects, after we had carried out all the
observations, in order to hear their explanations for shielding
decisions.
(5) Inconspicuousness: the observer acted as required by the en-
vironment so that he did not stand out unduly. For example,
if he was observing in a coffee shop he ordered a coffee, if he
was observing out in the street he sat on a bench and appeared
to be resting. He engaged in no interaction with the subjects,
so as not to occasion any disquiet.
(6) Recording Protocol: the observer manually recorded the data
related to the subject’s shielding actions.
Limitation Precaution
(a) Observer Effect (1) Privacy,
(3) Anonymity
(b) Objectivity (6) Reporting Protocol
(c) Selectivity (2) Location Accessibility
& Variety
(d) Hearing the subjects’ voices (4) Respect
(e) Unobtrusiveness (5) Inconspicuousness
Table 2: The mapping from the aforementioned limitations to
the precautions we took in designing our study.
We informally consulted lawyers and experts from data protection
authorities in the respective countries. We also asked Karlsruhe
Institute of Technology’s legal department to provide feedback re-
garding the legal aspects of our study design. Given the precautions
we designed into our study, as detailed above, they could not iden-
tify any legal issues with our study design. This included observa-
tions carried out in indoor locations, such as restaurants. None of
the lawyers we consulted could see that we needed to get in touch
with the owner/manager of these locations beforehand, given the
precautions we took. In particular, we respected the privacy of the
subjects we observed and did not not interact with, or impede, any-
one. They also confirmed that, given these precautions, we did not
have to obtain signed consent from the subjects. Again, the most
important aspects were that subjects were essentially anonymous
for research purposes, and that the researcher did not interact with
them in any way.
In conclusion, we planned our study activities carefully in order to
ensure that we did not harm the safety, dignity, or privacy of the
people we observed, as advised by the European Commission [19].
2.6 Methodology Limitations
Following the De Luca et al.’s [10] methodology means facing the
same limitations. As explained by De Luca et al., it was impor-
tant not to interview subjects after observing their actions. Instead,
an independent set of people was interviewed. That being so, the
same limitation holds: the explanations provided by our intervie-
wees were not directly provided by the observed subjects and thus
cannot be considered to be reliable causatives.
It is also possible that people falsely represented their usual PIN-
related actions during interviews due to social desirability of mak-
ing a good impression, or to please the interviewer. We have no
indication that this happened but this limitation must be acknowl-
edged.
3. FINDINGS
We first present the findings from the observation field study and
then those from the follow-up interviews.
3.1 Observation Field Study
The details of the study are provided in Table 3 and summarized in
Table 4.
Results from Replication. De Luca et al. [10] reported that 120 out
of 360 (33.3%) of the people they observed at ATMs did observ-
ably shield their input. We recorded that 39% of the people being
observed at ATMs in Germany shielded their PINs, with 29% in
both Sweden and the United Kingdom shielding.
We compared the shielding behavior at ATMs in all locations with
that reported by De Luca et al. [10] on pair-wise significance with
two-proportion z-tests. This method is appropriate for single char-
acteristics (binary data) of two independent groups sampled at ran-
dom [7]. The tested hypothesis is that shielding incidence at each
of the three locations differ significantly from that reported by De
Luca et al. . The null hypothesis is that there is no difference. The
results of all tests reveal no significant differences at p<.05 (see
Table 5), therefore the alternative hypothesis is rejected, although
this does not mean that the null hypothesis would be accepted.
Regression Modelling. We tested the collected data (see Table 3)
with regression modelling techniques and set the shielding behavior
as the dependent variable. Categorical variables, e.g. the country
of observation, were coded into indicator variables before perform-
ing the regression modelling. We identified the person’s activity of
either withdrawing or paying, as well as the country in which the
sample was collected, as significant predictors of shielding behav-
iors (see Table 6). The linear regression model accounts for about
10% of the variation (R2 =.100, corrected R2 =.0956, and stan-
dard error =.382). The model provided a significant prediction of
the criteria ‘shielding behavior’ with F=20.636 and p<.001. The
regression model identified two significant predictors for shielding
behavior: the country in which the sample is collected and the ac-
tivity of either withdrawing or paying. It does not indicate whether
the combination of both significant predictors is a significant pre-
dictor as well, i.e.
• It is more likely that people shielded their PINs when with-
drawing money, as compared to paying.
• It is more likely that people shielded their PINs in Germany,
as compared to the United Kingdom and Sweden. It is also
more likely for people in the United Kingdom to shield their
PINs, as compared to Sweden.
Post-hoc ANOVA comparison. We tested the between-subjects ef-
fect of independent variables ‘country’ and ‘scenario’ (i.e. pay-
ing versus withdrawing at ATMs versus supermarket versus restau-
rant/coffee bars (labelled ‘others’ in Table 3)) on the dependent
variable ‘shielding behavior’ with two-way ANOVA. We have ap-
plied the Sidak correction to compensate for the accumulation of
United Kingdom Germany Sweden
ATM Pay Sup Others ATM Pay Sup Others ATM Pay Sup Others
Total 90 220 100 120 90 220 100 120 90 220 100 120
Shield 29%(26) 14%(30) 13%(13) 14%(17) 36%(32) 34%(74) 34%(34) 33%(40) 29%(26) 0% 0% 0%
Company 13% 12) 35%(79) 47%(47) 27%(32) 3%(3) 30%(65) 42%(42) 19%(23) 8% (7) – – –

shield 58%(7) 15%(12) 15%(7) 16%(5) 0% 31%(20) 33%(14) 26%(6) 14%(1) – – –
Table 3: The percentages and total amounts for the observations, per scenario, and per country. Note that “Others” refers to
restaurants and coffee bars. A long dash denotes irrelevance of the data field due to ‘0%’ in the row above. ‘Sup’ is used as shortcut
for supermarket due to space constraints.
ATM Pay Supermarket Others
Total 270 660 300 360
Shield 31% (84) 16% (104) 16% (47) 16% (57)
Company 8% (22) 31% (206) 45% (129) 23% (77)

shield 36% (8) 16% (32) 16% (21) 14% (11)
Table 4: The percentages and total numbers for the observa-
tions per scenarios for all three countries. Note that “Others”
refers to restaurants and coffee bars.
United Kingdom Germany Sweden
z-score -0.81 0.4 -0.81
p value .42 .69 .42
Table 5: The results of the two-proportion z-test on data re-
ported by De Luca et al. [10] and our ATM samples.
Standardised beta T Significance
Germany .303 8.409 <.001
ATM .174 4.961 <.001
United Kingdom .113 3.124 .002
Company .010 .289 .773
Supermarket -.004 -.117 .907
Table 6: The regression model data, with coefficients for de-
pendent variables of whether subjects shielded the PIN entry,
or not.
type I error. Both major effects as well as the interaction were sig-
nificant. Since there were no a-priori hypotheses, we calculated
post-hoc comparisons, comparing behavior in the three countries
across all scenarios. The results are presented in Table 7. The most
important findings are:
• For the withdrawal scenarios, there were no significant dif-
ferences between shielding across the three countries.
• For the payment scenarios, there are significantly more sub-
jects in Germany who shielded their PINs, as compared to
the other two countries.
• For the payment scenario, significantly more United King-
dom subjects shielded their PINs, as compared to those in
Sweden.
• In Germany, there is no significant difference between shield-
ing while either withdrawing or paying.
• There are significant differences between the three scenar-
ios (withdrawing and supermarket/coffee bar) in the United
Kingdom and Sweden (with fewer people shielding their PINs
during payment, as compared to withdrawing).
• No differences, in terms of PIN shielding, manifested be-
tween the two different payment scenarios: supermarkets and
others (restaurants/coffee bars), across all three countries.
We did not find any differences in terms of ‘being accompanied
during PIN entry’, neither for the whole sample nor for the three
different country-specific samples.
3.2 Follow-Up: Public Interviews
The focus of our interviews was on explaining the differences be-
tween withdrawing and paying in the different countries. We con-
ducted a total of 27 interviews: ten in Sweden, ten in the United
Kingdom and seven in Germany. The written notes were coded
by two of the authors. We used structural coding [27] for initial
segmentation of the data and magnitude coding [28, 42] on the col-
lected segments. A three-level magnitude code was applied: sev-
eral > some > few. The following categories, as possible explana-
tions for shielding, were identified.
3.2.1 ATM Environments Considered More Risky
Several subjects said that they considered the ATM environment to
be less safe. One reason, cited by several interviewees, is that there
was little to no media coverage of PIN-related crime elsewhere than
at ATMs. During some interviews, it was reported that ATMs were
often in less secure environments, especially when they were out-
side banks. Several participants mentioned that strangers hanging
around ATMs were mistrusted more than in other scenarios “...at an
ATM anyone could stand behind you. But people in a supermarket
are there to buy something”). Actually, in payment scenarios, the
subjects perceived strangers as a ‘protector’, and assumed that they
would implicitly provide protection by spotting external threats. In
particular, the cashier and accompanying friends are perceived to
be another person who can ‘exercise care’. In Germany, in partic-
ular, customers commonly hand over the card to the cashier, who
then puts the card into the device, prepares everything and asks the
customer to enter their PIN. Few interviewees mentioned that the
cashier or waitresses are usually discreet enough to turn their bod-
ies away, or avert their eyes, when a customer is entering their PIN.
Thus, other than the withdrawal scenario, people did not consider
co-located people a threat in supermarkets, restaurants and shops.
Few subjects were not particularly specific but just commented:
“You’re not supposed to get robbed in stores” or “Not something
you usually think about in a store”
3.2.2 Reminded by Displayed Advice
During some interviews, subjects mentioned that they shielded their
PINs when they were visibly reminded to do so. It was acknowl-
edged that only ATMs display such advice: “There are warnings
Mean diff. Standard error Sign.
95% conf. interval for the difference
Lower boundary upper boundary
ATM
Germany U.K. ,067 ,057 ,559 -,069 ,202
Germany Sweden .067 .057 .559 -.069 .202
U.K. Sweden <0.01 .057 1.000 -.135 .135
Supermarket
Germany U.K. .210* .054 .000* .082 .338
Germany Sweden .340* .054 .000* .212 .468
U.K. Sweden .130* .054 .046* .002 .258
Others
Germany U.K. .192* .049 .000* .074 .309
Germany Sweden .333* .049 .000* .216 .451
U.K. Sweden .142* .049 .012* .024 .259
Germany
ATM supermarket .016 .055 .989 -.116 .147
ATM Others .022 .053 .966 -.104 .149
Supermarket Others .007 .051 .999 -.116 .130
UK
ATM supermarket .159* .055 .012* .027 .291
ATM Restaurant / Cafe .147* .053 .016* .021 .274
Supermarket Others -.012 .051 .994 -.135 .111
Sweden
ATM supermarket .289* .055 .000* .157 .421
ATM Others .289* .053 .000* .162 .415
Supermarket Others <0.01 .051 1.000 -.123 .123
Table 7: Results of post-hoc comparisons for the three countries, in terms of the scenario, and for the three scenarios for the three
countries. Those that are significant are starred.
at ATMs, thus I cover automatically. Else I wouldn’t because there
is no need”. Indeed, in our study only the ATMs displayed such
reminders.
3.2.3 Cash Perceptions
Few interviewees expressed their views that ATMs would be more
strongly connected to bank accounts and to hard cash (“Because
the ATM is, like, about money”). In their opinion, this perception
would frame actions in the vicinity, implicitly prompting security
precautions.
3.2.4 Habitual Protective Actions
Some subjects merely said shielding was a habit, perhaps prompted
some time ago because they had observed others doing it (social
norm), or because their parents taught them to do it. This type of
argumentation was actually used in both ways: some participants
said others are doing it (in particular friends or parents), which is
why they shield their PIN without really thinking about it: “This
is just normal”. But few others argued that it is normal to enter
the PIN, as “fast as possible” as no one else shields. A few also
considered that the shopping scenario exerts more time pressure
than the ATM scenario: at ATMs people generally stand back and
the activity is essentially solo, whereas payment scenarios usually
involve at least one other person who is somehow involved in the
transaction.
3.2.5 Social Awkwardness
Some people were put off by impressions of social unacceptabil-
ity. Some participants reported that shielding might signal mistrust
to people around you: “I don’t want to look like a freak”, “Only
old people cover”, “Covering feels stupid”, “People who cover are
paranoid”. While these reasons may hold for both scenarios, it
might be worse for paying. These subjects mentioned that they
are often accompanied by friends or relatives during payment sce-
narios. On the other hand, they usually withdrew money on their
own. One mentioned situational differences: at the supermarket,
friends usually go to the cash register together while someone usu-
ally breaks away from the group to withdraw money.
3.2.6 Further Findings
While the sample is clearly not representative, we can conclude the
following:
• Very few interviewees specifically mentioned attacks. For
example, it is easier to install a skimmer on an ATM. Some
mentioned the risk related to strategically-placed surveillance
cameras that are able to record unshielded PINs. However,
such threats were only mentioned as related to the ATM con-
text. Some subjects only considered shielding necessary at
ATMs if strangers were standing too close for comfort. Sim-
ilar findings were reported by De Luca et al. [10]. They,
too, reported subjects securing their PINs by entering them
as quickly as possible. Others checked the surrounding area
before approaching an ATM machine or blocked the ATM
with their bodies.
• No interviewees mentioned that the actual behavior is af-
fected by an installed plastic shield over the PIN pad. They
did not mention the presence of these, nor whether these were
considered helpful and/or effective.
• Physical hindrance was not mentioned by our subjects. This
was identified as factor influencing shielding likelihood by
De Luca et al. [10] during their observations.
• In Germany, of the seven people we interviewed, six men-
tioned PIN shielding in their initial descriptions of what they
did in the two scenarios. In the United Kingdom, and partic-
ularly in Sweden, interviewees explicitly distinguished be-
tween ATM withdrawal and payment scenarios in this re-
spect.
4. DISCUSSION
Our study replicated and extended one particular aspect of De Luca
et al.’s ATM study. We focused primarily on the PIN entry aspects
of the original study, and then extended the study to different card
usage environments.
4.1 Country Differences for Payment Scenar-
ios
The interesting differences here are firstly that there was almost no
difference in shielding between withdrawal and payment transac-
tions in Germany. The second interesting finding was that no sub-
jects in Sweden shielded during payment transactions. The third is
the difference in payment shielding between the three countries.
A number of explanations can be advanced for these relative out-
liers. In the first place, there might be significant differences in
the frequency of card use and the amount of money involved in
each transaction. The Swedish population uses their cards to pay
far more than the German population at large (Table 1). Thus, in
Sweden, paying by card seems to be de rigeur i.e. nothing out of
the ordinary requiring special attentiveness.
Moreover, there is also a difference in amounts paid using cards. In
Germany, the average amount is more than twice that of Sweden,
while the amount in the United Kingdom is in-between the German
and Swedish averages. Hence the risk associated with the transac-
tions is greater in Germany, and subjects might well be behaving in
accordance with heightened risk perceptions. The status quo might
well change over the next few years as Germany, for example, has
recently introduced PIN-less payments for amounts less than AC30.
These numbers accord with our insights from the follow-up inter-
views: The number of payment instances (both paying oneself us-
ing Chip & PIN, as well as observing others doing so) make people
less likely to shield. The extreme observations (no one shielding
in the payment scenario) in Sweden might also be due to the high
level of trust and transparency in Swedish society [32].
4.2 Differences Between Payment and ATM
Withdrawal
Our United Kingdom and Swedish subjects were more likely to
shield their PINs when withdrawing money than when paying. The
following findings from our follow-up interviews suggest explana-
tions for this:
• In one scenario, people receive cash in hand, and for the
other the transfer of money happened invisibly. People as-
sociate security measures with cash and therefore are more
likely to shield in the withdrawing scenarios, as compared to
the payment scenarios. Similar findings can be found in the
literature: Bijleveld and Aarts [5] explain that “Money [...]
activates knowledge structures that are incompatible with the
pursuit of social harmony” [5, page 16]. Related to this is
also the following finding from the literature: There is a sub-
stantial difference in terms of goal satisfaction. As opposed
to obtaining cash, the primary goal of buying something is
to obtain an object or experience. The underlying purpose
is to maximize happiness [8]. Money becomes a secondary
concern, a mere facilitator.
• People say they are more likely to shield during withdrawals
because ATMs often display reminders to shield. There is
more space to place a sticker or to display the reminder on
the screen.
• People perceive ATM environments as being more risky than
payment contexts in supermarkets, coffee bars, or restau-
rants. This explanation suggests the existence of misunder-
standings or a lack of awareness of the full range of attack
vectors. In both cases, there is a risk of manipulated devices
and cameras recording PINs, without a human needing to be
anywhere near the person using the card.
• People are more ‘alone’ at ATMs, thus social awkwardness,
which would perhaps prevent them from shielding, is less of
an issue.
4.3 Comparing to De Luca’s ATM withdrawals
We replicated De Luca et al.’s [10] results with respect to the per-
centages of people shielding their PINs at ATMs. The explanation
for the relatively low percentages might still be the same as those
advanced by De Luca et al. i.e. lack of awareness of actual attacker
tactics and, corresponding misconceptions regarding the effective-
ness of the security measures that they currently take (e.g. checking
that nobody is loitering close by).
This low number also indicates that effective protection can only
be assured when the PIN pad has pre-installed shields that prevent
PIN leakage. However, it is still important to ensure usability for a
wide range of people, including those with disabilities.
4.4 Impact of being Accompanied
We did not uncover any differences in terms of ‘being accompa-
nied by other people’ (e.g. friends, relatives) during PIN entry.
Both the interviews by De Luca et al. [10] and ours may create the
impression that being accompanied makes a difference. A number
of interviewees mentioned the social awkwardness that arises from
shielding when accompanied by friends or acquaintances.
It is worth mentioning that in all three countries only very few ob-
servations recorded subjects being accompanied at ATMs. The lack
of a finding might be a consequence of the low numbers. On the
other hand, it looks as if this situation is not very typical because
our interviewees suggested that cash withdrawal is generally a solo
activity. While friends often accompany each other at the cash reg-
ister, they do not, as a rule, join each other at the ATM.
It looks as if those Germans who do shield make a habit of shield-
ing: those who have this habit always shield when using their cards,
with no differences between withdrawal and payment transactions.
They either always shield, or never shield. The context does not
seem to influence them, nor does the presence or absence of any
other people around them.
In the United Kingdom and Sweden, people shielding their PINs
are already in such a minority that the cultural norm of not shielding
might well perpetuate not shielding, even when accompanied.
4.5 Limitations
The observation field study, as well as the follow-up interviews,
took place in three medium-sized cities in three European coun-
tries. Thus, the results have only limited validity with respect to
large European cities, small towns, or cities in other countries.
We observed PIN shielding from some distance to guarantee anony-
mity and privacy. This comes with some limitations. A subject was
counted as having shielded the PIN as soon as this person used
his/her hand, or some other object to shield the PIN pad. However,
even if they did shield their PIN entry, they might not have entirely
prevented observation from some other vantage point than the one
taken by our observer. What we recorded was shielding attempts,
not efficacy. Moreover, by only observing whether or not someone
acted to shield PIN entry, we did not record other protective activi-
ties such as checking for surveillance cameras or ensuring that no-
body in the vicinity was trying to observe their PIN entry. It might
be that subjects did engage in some situational awareness activities
and made a perfectly valid low risk assessment. Even if they did
realize that someone was close enough to observe their PIN, they
might well have interposed their own body between that person and
the PIN pad. These kinds of precautions might have been effective
in a pre-surveillance era, but with cameras in inner cities, and espe-
cially at ATMs, recording people all the time, such precautions are
less than effective.
We compared our results to De Luca et al.’s. We were able to
replicate their results with respect to people shielding their PINs at
ATMs. We are aware that the criteria we used for shielding might
be slightly different in the two studies because the observers were
different people. Yet we did attempt to replicate the study as exactly
as possible, based on the information reported in the paper.
The follow-up interview responses might have elicited social de-
sirability responses, but this is a common issue for any interview
situation in the security context. We tried to address this limitation
by commencing with an innocuous question asking them to detail
their own actions in withdrawing and paying with their Chip & PIN
cards. Only after this did we focus on the real issue, i.e. shielding,
exploring their perspectives on the need for this action.
5. RELATED WORK
We set out to replicate De Luca et al.’s study and another two re-
searchers also recently carried out a non-participant observation
study of PIN-related behaviors at ATMs. Ashby and Thorpe [2]
observed people entering their PINs at a number of different lo-
cations of one bank’s ATM machines in London. They focused
on “hot spot” areas, those where ATM crimes were highest in the
London area. Their study revealed that 47% of subjects attempted
to cover the PIN pad when they entered their PINs. Unlike our
study, they observed only ATM usage, and only in one country. The
higher shielding percentages might well be due to the fact that they
focused specifically on crime hotspots. This intuition gains some
confirmation from the fact that when they interviewed a subset of
their observed subjects, and asked them what kinds of precautions
they took, the most common one was to use only ATMs that were
in safe areas.
A number of papers exist on usable security ATM research. For ex-
ample, in [9], the authors studied and discussed the idea of biomet-
ric authentication at ATMs. Their research revealed a number of
non-trivial issues with the introduction of this type authentication
for ATMs. Little [24] examined the influence of external factors on
ATM use in general. Privacy was one identified factor that aligns
with our findings.
Other observation studies of visibly revealed security-related be-
haviors appear in the research literature. Von Zezschwitz et al.
[41] studied real-world behavior related to Android authentication
patterns. This helped them to compare the real life usability of
these patterns to the more traditional PINs. Machuletz et al. [26]
observed people working in public, to see how prevalent webcam
covering behavior was. Greig et al. [18] carried out an observation
study of one particular branch of a chain store to monitor security-
related behaviors. Despite regular information security training
and general awareness, they observed passwords written on black-
boards, sharing of credentials and staff taking photos of till screens.
Other researchers left USB sticks lying around to see how many
people would plug them in [40]. The visible behavior, here, was
plugging the stick in the USB port of a PC, and half of their sub-
jects did so. A number of researchers have proposed sending out
fake phishing messages to employees to test actual resilience after
phishing awareness training [20, 21, 35]. These kinds of exercises
seem to be becoming popular in industry [15, 30]. Finally, Forget
et al. [17] propose a security behavior observation infrastructure to
effect long-term monitoring of user behaviors on client machines
and Lévesque et al. [22], along the same lines, propose a method-
ology for a field study of anti-malware software.
6. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
We carried out a field study, during which we observed 930 Chip
& PIN card uses, in three countries and in different scenarios, with
people either withdrawing or paying. There were significant dif-
ferences with respect to the scenario, with people shielding their
PINs significantly less often when they withdrew cash than when
they paid in two of the countries (the United Kingdom and Swe-
den). In Germany, shielding occurrence was equal in both situa-
tions. In addition, we carried out interviews to identify factors that
may explain what we observed. These include habituation, lack of
reminders, the influence of cash in hand, and a lack of awareness
of actual attack scenarios.
In general, the percentage of people shielding is surprisingly low,
given that they could lose their hard earned money. We were able to
confirm De Luca et al.’s findings with respect to the low percentage
of people shielding their PINs when withdrawing money at ATMs.
Based on our findings, a number of interesting future research ques-
tions emerged:
• What influence does the amount of money that someone with-
draws or pays have on the decision to shield? In Germany
and the United Kingdom / Sweden the average transaction
amounts are different. Is this one possible explanation for
the identified differences between these countries?
• Based on the identified explanations, it would also be ad-
visable to study the influence of the type and size of plastic
shields over PIN pads, and the actual impact of reminders, as
also suggested by [2].
• What is the influence of the actual/perceived liability of card-
holders on the decision to shield? Initial investigations sug-
gest that mixed messages are sent by different banks we con-
tacted and information provided on their websites. We in-
formally polled a number of people in our respective coun-
tries about their understanding and discovered that people
have different ideas about whether, and what types of, con-
sequences they might have to face if their PIN is covertly
observed and their card subsequently stolen without their
knowledge.
• In the interviews, the scenario of the cashier or waitress putting
the card into the device for the payee emerged. This is an ad-
ditional scenario to study as future work. A similar extension
would be to study behavior at ticket machines, which are
somehow inbetween pure withdrawal (ATM) and the usual
store payment scenarios.
However, the long-term goal must be to replace existing devices
with those that have opaque shields pre-installed. In the mean-
while, another area of future work could be awareness raising, be-
cause one of the findings that emerged from the interviews was that
people were not aware of the surveillance camera attack scenarios.
They tend to rely on their innate yet inaccurate sense that humans
are the greatest threat in these scenarios.
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